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STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff?Appellee,
CaseNo.20010509-CA

v.
TOMMY LEE ANGELOS,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF

£E

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a sentence entered pursuant to a plea in abeyance to two
inscription under false pretenses, a third degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(3)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2002
Davis County, Utah, the Honorable Jon M. Memmott presiding. This Court has
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue No. •*" "/here defendant was properly re-sentenced with counsel present, is
Ins i j j i m ll

d plamr

sentencing him without counsel moot?

Standard of Review: No standard of review applies.

1

:,

Issue No. 2: Did the trial court plainly err where defendant was given adequate
notice of the trial court's intention to terminate his plea agreement, and where defendant
fails to show that he was harmed by any lack of notice?
Standard of Review: Defendant's claim is reviewed for plain error. See State v.
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208-09 (Utah 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statute is reproduced in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-4 (1999).
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
On four separate occasions during October 1999, defendant used false names and
addresses to obtain prescription Loratabfrom.theCenterville Albertson's pharmacy. R.
1-3; 12:7.1 When questioned about Ac validity of the prescriptions, the doctors named on
the prescriptions informed the pharmacy that they had not prescribed that medication to
defendant. R. 1-3.

Defendant was charged by information with four counts of obtaining a prescription
under false pretenses, each third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-

j

Citation to the unnumbered transcript dated January 21,2000 to May 24, 2001
which contains 38 different tabs marking individual proceedings including the sentencing
hearing dated May 15, 2001, will be made by specifying the numbered tab followed by a
colon and then the specific page of that document (i.e. tab number twelve, page one of the
transcript would be cited as 12:1).
2

8(3)(a)(ii) (1998). R. 1-3. Defendant retained William Albright as counsel. R.2:l.
During preliminary proceedings, the trial court recommended defendant for admittance
into the Davis County Drug Court program. R. 2:1-2; 3:1-4; 4:1; 5:1-2; 6:1-2. On May 9,
2000, defendant entered a guilty plea to two counts of obtaining a prescription under false
pretenses, to be held in abeyance for 36 months pending his completion of the drug court
program. R. 48-55; 12:1-11. In exchange for defendant's plea in abeyance, the two
remaining charges were dismissed. R. 48-53; 12:3.
Several weeks latter, on June 20,2000, defendant was picked up for using alcohol
in violation of the terms of his agreement. R. 48-53; 17:1-6. Defendant was then
admitted into both the Addiction Treatment Unit (ATU) and Addiction Recovery Center
(ARC) programs. R. 18:1-3. Three months later, after completing those programs,
defendant again violated the terms of his agreement when he was picked up while driving
with a blood alcohol level of .297. R. 48-53; 27:1-3. Defendant confessed to the
violation. R. 27:1-3; 28:1-2. In response, the court committed defendant to the county
jail for six months and required that he complete Residential Substance Abuse Treatment
(RSAT), afive-monthprogram offered through the jail. R. 80-81, 85; 28:1-2. Upon
completion of his jail term, on March 27, 2001 defendant was accepted back into the drug
court program and admitted to the University of Utah aftercare treatment program. R. 8788, 97-98; 29:1; 30:1, 33:1-2.
On April 24, 2001, when defendant failed to attend his weekly review hearing and
drug test, the court issued an arrest warrant. R. 104-05, 107; 37:2. Defendant was
•3

i
brought before the court on May 8, 2001. R. 155. During that hearing, the court charged
defendant with violating the terms of his plea agreement for drinking alcohol, stealing
mini bottles of alcohol from his work, gettingfiredfromhis job, living awayfromhome,
failing to appear for treatment, and failing to appear for drug testing. R. 155:1.
Defendant admitted to the violations and stated, "I don't want to go through any more

A

programs.'* R. 155:1-2. The court then ordered AP&P to complete a recommendation
and set the case for sentencing. R. 155:2-3.

<

On May 15,2001, defendant appeared before the trial court for sentencing without
counsel. R. 108-09; 38:1. The court revoked defendant's plea in abeyance and sentenced
defendant to prison for the statutory term of zero to five years, R. 38:3-4. However,
consistent with AP&P's recommendation, that sentence was stayed and defendant was
ordered to serve one year in jail with no credit for time served and 36 months probation.
R. 38:4. At that point, defendant stated that he did not have an attorney, and he requested
that one be appointed to him for purposes of an appeal. R. 38:4-5. In response, the court
offered to let defendant talk to his present appellate coimsel. R. 38:5-6. Defendant timely
appealed the trial court's sentencing order dated May 15,2001. R. 127.
Six months later, on November 13,2001, with his attorney present, defendant's
remaining jail term was suspended and he was re-sentenced to probation. R. 130-31.

4

ARGUMENT SUMMARY
POINT I: Defendant was sentenced on May 15,2001 without counsel. On appeal,
defendant claims that the trial court's action violated his state and federal constitutional
right to counsel at sentencing, and thus constitutes plain error. Defendant asks this court
to vacate his sentence and remand the case for re-sentencing. However, defendant fails to
acknowledge that he was re-sentenced with counsel present on November 13,2001.
Where defendant pled guilty to the charges, no collateral legal consequences result from
the re-sentencing. Therefore, because defendant received the remedy he now seeks on
appeal, his claim is moot and need not be considered by this Court.
POINT II: Defendant also argues that the trial court plainly erred by not giving
him notice or opportunity to prepare for the May 8,2001 evidentiary hearing regarding
his violation of the terms of his plea agreement. Thus, defendant claims that his due
processrightswere violated. The record, however, reveals that defendant had adequate
notice of the trial court's intention to terminate defendant's plea in abeyance and ample
opportunity to prepare for the evidentiary hearing. Because defendant cannot show that
the trial court erred, his plain error argument fails.
To prove plain error, defendant must also show that he suffered prejudice as a
result of the trial court's alleged error. Even if the notice were viewed as inadequate,
defendant still fails to show that he was harmed by the trial court's alleged inaction. The
record indicates that defendant freely admitted to violating the terms of his plea
agreement at the May 8 hearing. Accordingly, where defendant had no intention of
• .' 5 \ . •

<

disputing the trial court's allegations, the result of the hearing would have been the same.
Therefore, defendant's plain error claim also fails on prejudice prong.

*

ARGUMENT
POINTI
'

.

.

•

l

WHERE DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY RESENTENCED WITH COUNSEL PRESENT, fflS CLAIM
THAT THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ERRED IN
SENTENCING HIM WITHOUT COUNSEL IS MOOT
•

.

'

•

•

•

'

'

- • . . : ' •

i

Contending that he has a federal and state constitutional right to be represented by
counsel at sentencing, defendant claims that the trial court plainly erred at the May 15,
2001 hearing by sentencing him to probation and one year in jail without counsel. Br. of
Aplt. at 13-19. Defendant asks this Court to vacate his sentence and to remand for a new
sentencing hearing with counsel present See Br. of Aplt. at 23.
The State agrees with defendant that sentencing is "a critical stage in a criminal
proceeding," at which a defendant has both a federal and state constitutionalrightto the
assistance of counsel. State v. Martinez, 925 P.2d 176,178 (Utah App. 1996), cert,
denied, 934 P.2d 652 (Utah 1997); accord Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967);
State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005,1007 (Utah 1982). The State also does not dispute that
defendant was unrepresented at the May 15,2001 hearing. Nevertheless, defendant's
appeal is moot because he received the relief he now seeks on appeal at the November 13,
2001 hearing.

6

1

"An issue on appeal is considered moot when 'the requested judicial relief cannot
affect the rights of the litigants.'" State v. Sims, 881 P.2d 840, 841 (Utah 1994) (citation
omitted). Additionally, "'a criminal case is moot only if it is shown that there is no
possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be imposed on the basis of the
challenged conviction.'" Martinez, 925 P.2d at 177 (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S.
40, 57 (1968)) (brackets omitted).
Granting defendant a remand in this case will not place him in a better position. In
State v. DeBoard, as in the instant case, the defendant complained that he was sentenced
without counsel and requested that his sentence be vacated and the case be remanded for
re-sentencing. State v. DeBoard, No 981387-CA (Utah App. April 1,1999) (unpublished
memorandum decision).2 Upon examining the record, this Court held that because
DeBoard was re-sentenced with counsel over a month later, he could not be placed in a
better position than he was already in. See id. Given that DeBoard had no remedy on
appeal, the court ruled that his issue was moot. See id. This case is strikingly similar to
DeBoard. Here, defense counsel was not present when the trial court sentenced
defendant, yet six months later, the trial court re-sentenced defendant at the November 13,
2001 hearing in which defense counsel was present. See R. 130-31. Thus, like DeBoard,
defendant already received the remedy he now seeks on appeal. Accordingly, because

2

DeBoard is cited pursuant to Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, f 16, 444
P.3d 734, which allows citation to memorandum decisions. A copy of DeBoard is
attached as Addendum B.
7

I

defendant's requested judicial relief cannot affect his rights his issue is moot. See Sims,
881P.2dat841.
Moreover, defendant does not complain that he received inadequate representation
during the November 13 hearing. Although defendant failed to include a transcript of that
hearing in the record, presumably both defendant and his attorney were able to present
any mitigating evidence and argue for a more lenient sentence. See State v. Penman, 964
P.2d 1157,1162 (Utah App. 1998) (When faced with an '"an [inadequate record on
appeal, [an appellate court] must assume the regularity of the proceedings below."')
(citing State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403,405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam)). See also State v.
Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 699 (Utah App. 1995) (assuming the regularity of the
proceedings below where the appellant failed to include a transcript in the record on
appeal), cert, denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996).
Additionally, '"there is no possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be
imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction.'" Martinez, 925 P.2d at 177 (citation
omitted). '"Collateral legal consequences' from a conviction [have] been defined to
include 'the use of the conviction to impeach the petitioner's character or as a factor in
determining a sentence in a future trial, as well as petitioner's inability to vote, engage in
certain businesses; or serve on a jury.'" Id. at 177 n. 1 (citing Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d
43,45 (Utah 1981)). None of those consequences apply here. Because "defendant
pleaded guilty to the crime and on appeal challenges only the procedures employed in
imposing [his] sentence^] [defendant's resulting sentence does not invoke the possible
8

,

collateral legal consequences." See id. at 177. Furthermore, where defendant's original
one year jail sentence was replaced with a new sentence after a hearing with counsel,
defendant cannot show any adverse collateral legal consequences from not having
counsel at the May 15 hearing.
Significantly, defendant has not alleged on appeal that the trial court abused its
discretion in imposing the final sentence of six months of suspended jail time and three
years probation or that his sentence was otherwise unfair. Indeed, defendant appealed
onlyfromthe original commitment order and notfromthe second sentence ordering only
probation. Defendant also does not explain what better result he could achieve on
remand. Thus, if this Court were to vacate defendant's sentence and remand for a new
sentencing hearing, it would only be requiring the trial court to repeat the November 13
hearing. See Martinez, 925 P.2dat 177.
In short, defendant simply has not shown how his requested relief would affect his
position or that the May 15 hearing resulted in ay adverse collateral legal consequences to
him. Defendant's appeal, therefore, is moot.3

3

"Utah courts occasionally invoke an exception to mootness for an issue that,
'although technically moot as to a particular litigant at the time of appeal, is of wide
concern, affects the public interest, is likely to recur in a similar manner, and because of
the brief time any one person is affected, would otherwise likely escape judicial review.'"
Id. at 177-78 (citing Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1981)). However, that
exception does not apply here. The underlying issue in this case—whether a defendant
has a constitutional right to counsel during sentencing—has been fully resolved. See id.
at 178 ("[I]t is well settled that sentencing is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding and
that defendants have arightto counsel during sentencing.") (citing Rhay, 389 U.S. at 137;
Casarez, 656 P.2d at 1007).

9

I

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT GAVE DEFENDANT ADEQUATE
NOTICE OF ITS INTENTION TO TERMINATE HIS
PLEA AGREEMENT; NOTWITHSTANDING THAT,
DEFENDANT CANNOT SHOW THAT HE WAS
HARMED BY ANY LACK OF NOTICE WHERE HE
FREELY ADMITTED TO VIOLATING THE TERMS
OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT

•

\

Defendant next claims that the trial court violated his due process rights. Br. of
Aplt. at 20-23. Specifically, defendant contends that the trial court plainly erred by not
providing him with adequate notice and opportunity to prepare for the evidentiary hearing
concerning termination of his plea in abeyance agreement Br. of Aplt at 21-23.4 In
making that argument, defendant suggests that the trial court amalgamated the evidentiary
hearing with the May 15 sentencing hearing, and that he did not receive a separate
evidentiary hearing in accordance with his plea agreement. Br. of Aplt at 21-23, n. 9.
Defendant ignores, however, the evidentiary hearing held on May 8,2001, in which he
admitted to violating the terms of his plea agreement and told the court that "[he did not]
don't want to go through any more [drug] programs." See R. 155:1-2. Notwithstanding
that omission, defendant fails to show that the trial court plainly erred.
4

On appeal, defendant erroneously labels himself as a "probationer/* citing both
Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1(12) (Supp. 2002) and State v. Martin, 1999 UT App 62, f 12,
976 P.2d 1224, which detail a standard probationer's due process rights. See Br. of Aplt.
at 20-23. Recently, in State v. Turnbow, 2001 UT App 59,114,21 P.3d 249, this Court
expressly held that "a plea in abeyance differs from probation in both its statutory
provisions and function[,]" and that "cases decided under the probation statutes are not
directly applicable to pleas in abeyance." Therefore, where the termination of
defendant's plea in abeyance is at issue here, both section 78-18-1(12) and Martin are
inapplicable to this case.
10

{

To establish plain error, defendant must demonstrate that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii)
the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful." State
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). "If any one of these requirements is not met,
plain error is not established/' Id. at 1209.
A.

Defendant fails to show that the trial court erred where he received
adequate notice of the trial court's intention to terminate his plea
agreement

Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-4(l), indicates that a defendant who has entered into a
plea in abeyance agreement has therightto notice of the trial court's intention to
terminate his plea agreement. Specifically, section 77-2a-4 states that in the event the
trial court becomes aware of a defendant's violation of the terms of his plea in abeyance
agreement, the court "may issue an order requiring the defendant to appear before the
court at a designated time and place to show cause why the court should not find the
terms of the agreement to have been violated and why the agreement should not be
terminated." Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-4(l) (1999). Once an evidentiary hearing is held
and it is determined that the defendant failed to comply with the terms of the plea in
abeyance agreement, the court may terminate the agreement and impose sentence. Id.
The record in this case indicates that the trial court complied with section 77-2a4(1) by providing defendant with timely and adequate notice of the May 8 evidentiary
hearing . See In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853 (Utah 1996) ("At a minimum, 4[t]imely and
adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way are at the very heart
of procedural fairness.'") (Citation omitted)). On April 24, 2001, fifteen days prior to
' M

i

May 8 hearing, the trial court became aware of defendant's second violation of the terms
of his plea agreement. See R. 104-05; 37:2. At that time, the court noted defendant's
absence from the hearing, his continued absence from his parent's home at night, and the
fact that he missed a required urinalysis test on April 22,2001. See id. The court issued a
i

warrant for defendant's arrest and ordered Detective Dave Bremmer to locate defendant
and bring him before the court. See id. Defendant next appeared before the court on May
8. See R. 155. Accordingly, the record suggests that at some point during those

fifteen

days, defendant was notified of the court's intention to terminate his plea agreement. See
id. . ..Although the trial court did not issue an order to show cause, the permissive
language of section 77-2a-4(l) indicating that "[the trial court] may issue an order
requiring the defendant to appear before the court at a designated time and place to show
cause" endorses the court's actions. Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-4(l) (1999) (emphasis
added). Where defendant had left home and his whereabouts were unknown to the court,
the court's only option to notify defendant was through an arrest warrant. See R. 37:2;
Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902,911 (Utah 1993) ("'Due process is
flexible and calls for the procedural protections that the given situation demands.'")
(Citation omitted). Accordingly, the court's act of issuing an arrest warrant for
defendant's violation of his plea agreement constituted adequate notice under section 77-

2a-4(l).

12
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Where defendant received adequate notice of the trial court's intention to terminate
his plea agreement, he cannot show the existence of any error. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at
1208. Thus, because defendant fails to prove thefirstprong of the plain error standard,
his claim fails. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 31, 12 P.3d 92 (where a defendant
cannot meet thefirstprong of the plain error test, a court need not consider the remaining
prongs).
B,

Where defendant admitted to violating the terms of his plea agreement
at the May 8 evidentiary hearing, defendant cannot show that he was
harmed by any lack of notice.

For defendant to succeed in his plain error claim, he must also show that any error
was harmful. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09. Even if this Court were tofindthat
defendant received inadequate notice, because he admitted to violating the terms of his
plea agreement, defendant cannot show that he was harmed by the trial court's alleged
inaction. The dialogue at the beginning of the May 8 evidentiary hearing reveals
defendant's admission.
THE COURT:

Tommy Angelos. Well, I can't believe all the things
you have done in the last few weeks. To be honest I'm
really extremely disappointed. I mean the record
shows that you were chinking. You werefiredfrom
your job. They indicated, they reported to me that
when they went to the room you were in they had
mini-bottles that were stolen, that they believe were
stolen from work that were in your room, [sic] You
were required to live at home; you left home. You
failed to appear for court. You failed to appear for
treatment. You failed to appear for drug testing.
You've had, it looks like you've just quit doing
everything for about three weeks.
13

DEFENDANT:

Actually about a week and a half. I relapsed and for
about five days I went on a binge. I went up to the
LDS Hospital to check in Day Spring. They had no
beds there. From there they took me down to Highland
Ridge, found me a bed. I called Kevin Howard the
following morning. He told me to stay there and he
would try to get a hold of you and we would try to set
up a meeting with you.

THE COURT:

Well, we're probably a little beyond meetings. I mean
you have been to a number of treatment programs and,
you know, you had a sponsor to help you. You had
your parents to help you. You had the treatment
people. You had a lot of people and, to be honest, you
turned your back on all of them, just walked away
from it. It wasn'tjust one person, you had a whole
bunch of people helping you and you decided on your
own to just turn your back and you knew that your
parents were concerned. Your parents told you
otherwise, that you were getting into problems. Your
sponsor told you [that] you were going to get into
problems doing the things you're doing and you did it
anyway. This isn't a situation where you just sort of
fell off the wagon and just relapsed. I mean that's a
real convenient way, you know, and one of your big
difficulties is that sometimes you just—you've been
through a program. You've been through RSEP. I
mean—

DEFENDANT:

I don't want to go through any more programs.

THE COURT:

Well, no, and you probably won't. You'll probably
just sit in jail or prison.

DEFENDANT:

Me and my parents have really never ever discussed
my disease. They think that when I leave jail I'm
cured and that's what they believe.

14

THE COURT:

Well, do you admit to those violations that I talked
about?

DEFENDANT:

Yeah.

R. 155:1-2.
Consistent with his admission, on appeal defendant does not deny that he violated
his plea agreement. See Br. of Aplt. at 21-23. Instead, he claims that he was not given
"notice and opportunity to prepare for [an evidentiary] hearing[.]" Id. at 21. However,
defendant's statement that "[he did not] want to go through any more programsf,]" is a
clear indication that defendant had no intention of refuting the trial court's allegations.
See R. 155:1-2. Indeed, defendant freely admitted violating his plea agreement. See id.
Therefore, even if defendant had received proper notice, the result of the evidentiary
hearing would not have changed. Accordingly, defendant cannot show that he was
harmed by any lack of notice or opportunity to prepare for the May 8 hearing. Thus,
defendant's claim that the trial court plainly erred fails. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209.

15

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm the
decision of the trial court.

^J?
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MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

COLEMERE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellee
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prepaid, to his/her counsel of record, as follows:
SCOTT L. WIGGINS
Arnold & Wiggins
American Plaza II, Suite 105
57 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

77-2a-4. Violation of plea in abeyance agreement — Hearing — Entry of judgment and imposition of sentence — Subsequent prosecutions*
(1) If, at any time during the term of the plea in abeyance agreement,
information comes to the attention of the prosecuting attorney or the court that
the defendant has violated any condition of the agreement, the court, at the
request of the prosecuting attorney, made by appropriate motion and affidavit,
or upon its own motion, may issue an order requiring the defendant to appear
before the court at a designated time and place to show cause why the court
should notfindthe terms of the agreement to have been violated and why the
agreement should not be terminated. If, following an evidentiary hearing, the
courtfindsthat the defendant has failed to substantially comply with any term
or condition of the plea in abeyance agreement, it may terminate the agreement and enter judgment of conviction and impose sentence against the
defendant for the offense to which the original plea was entered. Upon entry of
judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence, any amounts paid by the
defendant as a plea in abeyance fee prior to termination of the agreement shall
be credited against any fine imposed by the court.
(2) The termination of a plea in abeyance agreement and subsequent entry
of judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence shall not bar any
independent prosecution arising from any offense that constituted a violation
of any term or condition of an agreement whereby the original plea was placed
in abeyance.

ADDENDUM B

Not Reported in P.2d
1999UTApp 101
(Cite as: 1999 WL 33244685 (Utah App.))
UNPUBLISHED OPINION.
RULES BEFORE CITING.

CHECK
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COURT

Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Kelly Ray DeBOARD, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 981387-CA.
April 1, 1999.
Catherine L. Begic and Deborah Kreeck Mendez,
Salt Lake City, for appellant.

in a similar manner, and, because of the brief time
any one person is affected, would otherwise likely
escape judicial review." Wickham v. Fisher, 629
P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1981). However, the exception
does not apply. The underlying issue of the
case-"that sentencing is a critical stage in a
criminal proceeding and that defendants have a
right to counsel during sentencing"--is already
well settled. State v. Martinez, 925 P.2d at 178
(citations omitted).
Accordingly, the trial court is affirmed.
1999 WL 33244685 (Utah App.), 1999 UT App 101
END OF DOCUMENT

Jan Graham and Laura B. Dupaix, Salt Lake City,
for appellee.
Before WILKINS, DAVIS, and ORME, JJ.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
PER CURIAM.
*1 DeBoard did not have counsel at the May 13,
1998, hearing, and requests this court to vacate his
sentence and remand for re-sentencing. However,
because DeBoard was represented by counsel at a
hearing on June 19, 1998, during which he was
formally sentenced, his claim raises a question of
mootness. See generally State v. Martinez, 925 P.2d
176 (Utah Ct.App. 1996).
An issue on appeal is considered moot when "the
requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of
the litigants." State v. Sims, 881 P.2d 840, 841
(Utah 1994) (citations omitted). Even if we accept
DeBoard's
claim
concerning
counsel
and
sentencing, we cannot put him in a better position
than he is already in because DeBoard had an
opportunity to be represented by counsel at the June
19th sentencing hearing.
Utah courts have invoked an exception to mootness
for an issue that "although technically moot as to a
particular litigant at the time of appeal, is of wide
concern, affects the public interest, is likely to recur
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Ong. U.S. Govt. Works

httD://orint.westlaw.com/del^

snnn?4?S7^
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ADDENDUM C

2nd District - Farmington Dept COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT
CONTINUANCE
NOTICE

vs.

Case No: 991701115 FS

TOMMY LEE ANGELOS,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

JON M. MEMMOTT
November 13, 2001

PRESENT
Clerk:
hilarym
Prosecutor: EDWARDS, MICHAEL S.
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): CELLA, GLEN T
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: September 13, 1969
Video
CHARGES
1. FALSELY OBTAINING/DISPENSING PRESCRIPTIN - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 09/12/2000 {Guilty Plea}
2. FALSELY OBTAINING/DISPENSING PRESCRIPTIN - 3rd Degree Felony

Plea: Guilty
CONTINUANCE

- Disposition: 09/12/2000 {Guilty Plea}

The Court has made a motion for continuance of Law & Motion.
The motion is granted.
Defendant is placed on probation. He will be transferred to the
Work Center to get signed up with AP&P, find employment and
residence.
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Case No: 991701115
Date:
Nov 13, 2001
PROBATION CONDITIONS:
002 CONDUCT: Commit no further violations of the law.
003 ALCOHOL: Do not use or possess alcoholic beverages or
frequent places where alcohol is the chief item for sale.
004 DRUGS: Do not use or possess controlled substance or be in
the presence of those who use, possess or distribute controlled
substances.
005 TESTING: Submit to body fluids testing for evidence of drug
or alcohol use.
007 PROGRAM/TREATMENT,: Enter, participate in and complete any
program, counseling or treatment as directed by AP&P.
008 SEARCH CONSENT: Submit to search of person, premises or
vehicle and seizure of any evidence without a search warrant at the
request of police or probation officer, if they have reasonable
cause.
010 EDUCATION/VOCATION: Participate in and complete any
educational or vocational training as directed by AP&P.
011 EMPLOYMENT: Obtain and maintain lawful, verifiable, full time
employment.
Notify AP&P of any and all prescription medications and get prior
approval from agent.
WORK CENTER REVIEW is scheduled.
Date: 11/20/2001
Time: 10:45 a.m.
Location: Courtroom 7
Justice Complex
800 West State Street
Farmington, UT 84025
Before Judge: JON M. MEMMOTT
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ADDENDUM D

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Appellate Court Case No. '20010509-CA

STATE OF UTAH,

District Court Case No. 991701115 FS

Plaintiff;
v
TOMMY LEE ANGELOS,
Defendant.

HEARING MAY 8, 2001
BEFORE
THE HONORABLE JON M. MEMMOTT

FJJ EH
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
^ d
X*y'p»9la
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
,, , . . . . . .
J w
1775 East Ellen Way
~
?
Sandy, Utah84092
^:=r,„,?
801-523-1186
C^c-'tho c^rt
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1 i

FARMINGTON,

2 J

UTAH - MAY 8 ,

2001

HONORABLE JON M. MEMMOTT PRESIDING

3 j

P R O C E E D I N G S

4 I

THE COURT: Tommy Angelos. Well, I can't believe all

5 j the things you have done in the last few weeks. To be honest
6

I'm really extremely disappointed. I mean the record shows that

7 J you were drinking. You were fired from your job. They
8

indicated, they reported to me that when they went to the room

9

you were in they had mini-bottles that were stolen, that they

10 I believe were stolen from work that were in your room. You were
11

required to live at home; you left home. You failed to appear

12

for court. You failed to appear for treatment. You failed to

13

appear for drug testing. You've had, it looks like you've just

14

quit doing everything for about three weeks.

15

THE DEFENDANT:

Actually about a week and a half. I

16

relapsed and for about five days I went on a binge. I went up

17

to the LDS Hospital to check in Day Spring. They had no beds

18

there.

From there they took me down to Highland Ridge, found

19 I me a bed. I called Kevin Howard the following morning.

He told

20

me to stay there and he would try to get a hold of you and we

21

would try to set up a meeting with you.

22

THE COURT:

Well, we're probably a little beyond

23

meetings. I mean you have been to a number of treatment

24

programs and, you know, you had a sponsor to help you.

25

your parents to help you.

I

You had

You had the treatment people.

You

1

had a lot of people and, to be honest, you turned your back on
all of them, just walked away from it. It wasn't just one
i

person, you had a whole bunch of people helping you and you
decided on your own to just turn your back and you knew that
your parents were concerned. Your parents told you otherwise,

j
i

l

that you were getting into problems. Your sponsor told you you j
i
i

were going to get into problems doing the things you're doing
and you did it anyway. This isn't a situation where you just J
sort of fell off the wagon and just relapsed. I mean that's a

;

real convenient way, you know, and one of your big difficulties I
i

is that sometimes you just - you've been through a program.

!

t

You've been through RSEP. I mean THE DEFENDANT:

I don't want to go through any more

|
i

programs.

<
THE COURT: Well, no, and you probably won't. You'll I

probably just sit in jail or prison.
THE DEFENDANT: Me and my parents have really never
ever discussed my disease. They think that when I leave jail
I'm cured and that's what they believe.
THE COURT: Well, do you admit to those violations
that I talked about?
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.
THE COURT:

What I'm going to do is I'm going to

continue this one week for sentencing. I don't think you're
going to be able to continue in Drug Court and probably the

j

decision to be made now is whether they're going to recommend
prison or whether they're going to recommend jail, how much
jail time, because I think we're out of program options.
THE DEFENDANT:

Now, when I was sentenced to RSEP I

was sentenced to a year; is that correct?
THE COURT: Well, yes, but that can be revoked because
of the violations and so you could do, you could be sentenced
to prison at this point. I'm going to wait, I'm going to get
the recommendations from AP&P and I'm going to get the
recommendations and see what they recommend and evaluate that.
So I will see you next week.
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
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